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I. DEFENDANTS' CRITICISM OF THE "ODD-LOT" DOCTERINE 
Defendants' opening Brief discusses the history and development of the "odd-lot" doctrine, 
on which the Industrial Commission founded its conclusion that Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled. In responding to this discussion, Claimant's Brief suggests that Defendants' 
argument may go beyond simply criticizing the Industrial Commission's application of the odd-
lot doctrine. It is suggested that the Defendants may actually be criticizing the odd-lot doctrine 
itself. To this charge, the Defendants will admit some measure of guilt. 
This case, at its essence, presented a fairly straightforward question: Did the industrial 
accident render Claimant permanently unable to return to work? Rather than allowing a 
straightforward approach to resolving that question, taking into account all relevant facts, the 
current application of the odd-lot doctrine forces the parties, their attorneys and the Industrial 
Commission into a quagmire of shifting burdens of proof, "three-pronged" tests and "five-factor" 
responses with differing evidentiary standards. As it has evolved over the years, the odd-lot 
doctrine would make Rube Goldberg envious. 
First, Claimant bears the burden of proving that he is not employable: i.e. a prima facie 
case of "odd-lot" status. If Claimant should succeed in this effort, then the burden shifts to the 
defendants to prove that the claimant is employable. If the claimant is to meet his initial burden, 
he must satisfy one of three prongs of the so-called "three-pronged test." One of those prongs, the 
one used in this case, is to establish that the Claimant is so disabled that any sort of work search 
would simply be "futile." Someone unfamiliar with the workings of the odd-lot doctrine might 
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assume that if the proof was so strong as to establish that any sort of work search would be a 
pointless waste of time, then the inquiry might be over; but not so. You see, although "futility" in 
the abstract would seem to be a very difficult standard to meet, in current practice it is not. One 
need only hire an expert witness willing to opine that a work search would be futile. (See e.g. the 
report of Terry Montague, Ex. 30). Consequently, under the current application of the odd lot 
doctrine a finding of"futility" may not actually mean that an injured worker can't return to work. 
The burden of proof shifts to the defendants to prove that the claimant is employable; i.e. to prove 
the existence of suitable employment. In this effort, defendants are to meet a test involving five 
factors. (See Respondent'sBriefp. 21 and Lyons v. Indus. Special lndem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403,565 
P.2d 1360 (1977)). As illogical as it may sound, the odd-lot doctrine, as it is currently applied, 
would allow for a claimant to establish that he is so disabled that any sort of work search would 
be futile, while still allowing the defendants to establish that suitable work is regularly available 
for Claimant. 
So yes, Defendants' Brief does offer criticism of the odd-lot doctrine itself, as well as 
criticism of the Commission's application of the doctrine to these facts. However, these 
Defendants are not suggesting that the Court needs to abandon the odd-lot doctrine or radically 
change it in order to resolve this case. That is not necessary to a resolution of this appeal. The 
background discussion in the opening brief, and this commentary here is simply offered to explain 
why it is that we are arguing over questions such as whether a work search can be "futile" where 
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a claimant actually turns down a legitimate offer to return to his former job. The odd lot doctrine, 
as it is currently applied, forces us into such discussions. 
II. A "QUESTION OF LAW" FOR RESOLUTION 
Respondent's Brief asserts that the Defendants have not raised any "question of law" for 
resolution on this appeal. Here's one: 
Did the Industrial Commission err in holding that a work search would have been "futile" 
for a claimant who actually rejected a bona fide offer to return to work for his time-of-injury 
employer? 
This is a central issue on appeal. It is not only a question oflaw but likely a matter of first 
impression for this Court. At least, the Defendants' research has not uncovered a comparable case 
where an injured worker rejected a genuine offer to return to his time-of-injury work and was still 
found to be totally and permanently disabled. Presumably, Claimant's research likewise turned 
up no such case. One would assume that, had such a case existed it would have been featured 
prominently in the briefing submitted by Claimant's able counsel. 
These Defendants submit that the Industrial Commission erred in its conclusion that a work 
search was "futile" (R. p. 33). The Industrial Commission reaches that conclusion by categorizing 
Mr. Rodriguez as an "older, uneducated fieldworker." (Id). Having met Mr. Rodriguez, the 
undersigned suspects that he would be offended by such a description. It ignores Claimant's 20+ 
years of work for the Employer during which developed detailed knowledge about the Employer's 
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operation, supervised other employees, and developed particular skills in operating the Employer's 
irrigation system. 
Even more problematic is that the Commission's conclusion that a work search was "futile" 
is entirely inconsistent with the finding that the Employer gave Claimant a bona fide opportunity 
to return to his time of injury work. These findings should be considered irreconcilable as a matter 
of law. It is only because of the rather peculiar case law that has developed under the odd-lot 
doctrine, that we are even discussing whether a work search may be "futile" where the Claimant 
actually turns down a legitimate job offer. Defendants respectfully suggest that the futility 
exception created in 1984 for Mr. Schuyler Carey was never intended to extend to this degree. 
See: Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54 (1984). 
Having made a finding that the Employer's job offer to Claimant was legitimate, it was 
error for the Commission to simultaneously hold that a job search would be "futile." This Court 
should reject the Commission's holding on futility and, if necessary, engage in a bit of judicial 
pruning of the thicket of case law that even allows for such a discussion of reconciling these 
concepts. 
Claimant did not conduct a job search. He did not have anyone else conduct a job search 
for him and he certainly shouldn't be excused from engaging in a work search on the basis of 
futility when he turned down the return-to-work opportunity provided to him. Claimant failed to 
meet his burden of proving aprimafacie case of odd lot status and the Commission's holding in 
that regard should be reversed. 
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III. THE DEFENDANTS ESTABLISHED THE EXISTANCE OF SUITABLE 
EMPLOYMENT FOR CLAIMANT. 
This is a case where the Defendant Employer did everything it was supposed to do in 
response to Mr. Rodriguez' injury. The Employer worked with the Industrial Commission's own 
vocational rehabilitation consultant, supported Claimant's recovery efforts and stood willing to 
modify his job duties and even modify equipment in order to allow Claimant the opportunity for a 
successful return to work. This is what we would all hope to see from employers. The employer's 
efforts to assist in Claimant's return to work were not made just out of sympathy for Mr. 
Rodriguez. As the Industrial Commission and its Referee recognized, Mr. Rodriguez was a long-
term valuable employee whose services were important to the Employer's operation. 
In the spring of 2012 after Claimant had reached medical stability he was offered an 
opportunity to return to work for the Employer in his time-of-injury position, with necessary 
modifications. The Referee concluded that the Employer's job offer was "legitimate and extended 
to Claimant out of Employer's desire to retain Claimant as a valuable employee." (R. p.74). The 
Industrial Commission did not question this finding. (R. pp. 29, 35). In the spring of 2012 
Claimant was given an opportunity to return to the job that he had been doing for the Employer 
for more than 20 years. He turned down this opportunity via a letter from his attorney. (Ex. 24 p. 
685). 
The Industrial Commission considered these facts in the context of the odd lot doctrine. 
Specifically, the Commission and its Referee endeavored to determine whether the Defendants 
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had met a "five factor test" from the Lyons decision regarding return to work opportunities. The 
Commission found that Claimant was offered an "actual job," within a reasonable distance from 
his home, but determined that the defendants had not met two factors of the Lyons test. The 
Commission majority opinion stated that it was "unclear" whether the job offered to Claimant was 
"suitable." (R. p.30). The Commission's majority also stated that Defendants had not met the 
burden of proving that the work was "regularly and continuously available" to Claimant. (R. p.36). 
Thus, the majority opinion found that the Defendants had failed to establish two of the five factors 
necessary under Lyons to defeat a presumption of futility. These holdings are both factually and 
legally flawed. 
As to "suitability" of the work for Claimant, it is hard to imagine what would be more 
suitable than a return to work for an employer with whom the Claimant had been employed for 
2o+ years, in a job that he knew. In fact, the vocational experts on both sides of this case agreed 
that a return to work for the employer was Claimant's best option. (Depo., Mary Barros-Bailey p. 
13; Depo., Terry Montague p.38). It is obvious from the Commission's majority decision that the 
concerns as to "suitability" of the job being offered to Claimant stem from questions about whether 
Claimant could actually perform the work. However, the evidence was that the Employer stood 
willing to essentially modify the job as necessary to allow for a successful return to work. The 
Commission majority opinion states that "it is impossible to know whether the modified job ... Is 
one that Claimant has retained the physical capacity to perform." (R. p. 30). As to this, the 
Defendants would respond first that is certainly not "impossible" for the Commission to reach a 
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conclusion as to the suitability of the work. The Commission makes decisions as to work 
suitability routinely. In this case, the Commission had medical evidence of Claimant's functional 
status, evidence as to the physical requirements of Claimant's time-of-injury job and evidence as 
to Employer's willingness to modify the job duties. It was possible for the Commission to reach a 
conclusion as to suitability of the work. They do it all the time. 
The way the Commission majority decision discusses the "suitability" issue seems to 
indicate that the Commission majority wanted to see something more conclusive, perhaps the 
result of an attempt to return to work. The Commission Referee was more candid in his proposed 
opinion. He frankly (but incorrectly) found that determination of the suitability of the work would 
be "speculative" because "Claimant never tried." (R. p. 74). If the Commission was seeking 
additional proof of Claimant's ability to return to work, it was deprived of that proof only because 
of Claimant's refusal to accept the job offer. 
The Commission's treatment of the "suitability" requirement clearly sends the wrong 
message to employers, to claimants and to their attorneys. It says to employers that there's really 
no point in attempting job modifications for injured workers. It sends a clear message to claimants 
and their attorneys that it would be foolhardy for a claimant seeking total permanent disability 
benefits to make any attempt to return to work. Now, with the decision in this case, the better 
course for that claimant is to hire a vocational expert to opine that a return to work would be 
"futile" and then refuse any proffered employment, thus depriving the defendants of the ability to 
prove the existence of "suitable" work. 
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These Defendants can understand that the Commission may have had questions about 
whether Mr. Rodriguez was physically able to return to the job being proposed for him. Those 
questions may very well have been resolved had Claimant accepted the return-to-work offer. He 
chose not to do so and it was this choice that deprived the Commission of the evidence that it 
seems to think is necessary. Under these facts, to reach the conclusion that the Defendants can't 
prove the suitability of the proffered employment, because Claimant didn't attempt to return to 
work sends the wrong message. It is bad precedent and bad policy. 
The Commission majority's decision on whether the modified work offered to Claimant 
was "regularly and continuously available" to Claimant is even more flawed, both factually and 
legally. Having found that the Employer's job offer to Claimant was legitimate and sincere, the 
Commission majority nonetheless determined that Defendants could not meet the burden of 
proving that the work was "regularly and continuously available" to Claimant. (R. pp. 31-32). As 
noted in the earlier briefing, the Commission majority reaches this conclusion by speculating that 
future economic conditions might drive future demand factors for hops, which might in turn make 
it more problematic for the Employer to provide the work to Claimant, which might jeopardize 
Claimant's future with the company. The Commission's speculation in this regard is completely 
inconsistent with the proven facts relating to Claimant's history of employment with the company. 
He had become a valued employee with over 20 years of experience and his employment had 
continued despite various ups and downs in the hops market. His employment had survived a 
relatively recent downturn in the demand for hops. It had survived the "Great Recession." The 
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parent corporation of Claimant's employer, Anheuser-Busch, has more than adequate financial 
resources. Claimant's Employer had a genuine desire to have him return to his work. Based on 
the actual proof in the record, Claimant's employment situation was about as stable as one could 
realistically hope for. There's simply no factual basis for the Commission majority to guess that 
future economic conditions might endanger Claimant's job. It was clear error to then use that 
guess as a substitute for evidence. 
Again, the Commission's handling of this issue sets a bad precedent for future cases. If the 
return to work offer presented to Mr. Rodriguez does not meet the Commission standard with 
regard to future stability of the work, one must ask what would meet that standard? The 
Commission's discussion of this issue raises a legitimate question as to whether any employer 
making a job offer to an injured worker could ever meet the "regularly and continuously available" 
standard as it is envisioned by the Commission majority. Evidently, the Commission majority 
envisions a job that would be unaffected by adverse future economic conditions. The Commission 
would apparently like to see a lifetime guarantee of employment that would continue regardless of 
future economic conditions. Perhaps such jobs exist somewhere. They do not exist in the real 
world. 
By any reasonable measure, the Defendants job offer to Claimant met the requirements that 
the work be suitable and regularly and continuously available. It was error for the Commission to 
minimize the significance of the Employer's efforts to enable Mr. Rodriguez to return to work. It 
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was error for the Commission majority to determine that Claimant was totally and permanently 
disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Commission's empathy for Mr. Rodriguez is understandable. The Commission's 
desire to help Mr. Rodriguez financially is understandable. However, the Commission majority 
did not have a suitable record to make the findings that it made with regard to total permanent 
disability. The Commission's majority decision, while perhaps benefiting Mr. Rodriguez, creates 
a very bad precedent for future cases. It will encourage injured workers claiming disability not to 
attempt any return to work. It will discourage employers from making the effort to accommodate 
injured workers. These incentives created by the majority decision run completely counter to the 
overall purpose of the workers' compensation system, which is to provide support for injured 
workers and assistance in bringing them back into the workforce. 
Lastly, with regard to the individual litigants in this case, while the majority decision may 
have some financial benefit for Claimant, it does a great disservice to the Employer, Elk Mountain 
Farms. It places on the Employer the burden of paying lifetime benefits to the Claimant in a 
circumstance where the Employer did everything right in response to Claimant's injury. While 
there is no doubt that Claimant suffered a significant injury, there is also no doubt that he made no 
effort to return to work after his medical condition stabilized. Claimant's injury does not prevent 
him from returning to work for Elk Mountain Farms. He has other opportunities as well. Claimant 
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is not totally and permanently disabled and this Court should reverse the Commission majority 
decision on that issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _\__.2_ day of May 2016. 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP 
s~~-w. SCOTT WIGLE, of the firm 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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